The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Volume 3: From Kant to Rawls

This book is a selective historical and critical study of moral philosophy in the Socratic tradition, with special attention to Aristotelian naturalism. It discusses the main topics of moral philosophy as they have developed historically, including: the human good, human nature, justice, friendship, and morality; the methods of moral inquiry; the virtues and their connexions; will, freedom, and responsibility; reason and emotion; relativism, subjectivism, and realism; the theological aspect of morality. The first volume discusses ancient and mediaeval moral philosophy. The second volume examines early modern moral philosophy from the 16th to the 18th century. This third volume continues the story up to Rawls's Theory of Justice. A comparison between the Kantian and the Aristotelian outlook is one central theme of the third volume. The chapters on Kant compare Kant both with his rationalist and empiricist predecessors and with the Aristotelian naturalist tradition. Reactions to Kant are traced through Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. Utilitarian and idealist approaches to Kantian and Aristotelian views are traced through Sidgwick, Bradley, and Green. Mill and Sidgwick provide a link between 18th-century rationalism and sentimentalism and the 20th-century debates in the metaphysics and epistemology of morality. These debates are explored in Moore, Ross, Stevenson, Hare, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, and in some more recent meta-ethical discussion. This volume concludes with a discussion of Rawls, with special emphasis on a comparison of his position with utilitarianism, intuitionism, Kantianism, naturalism, and idealism. Since this book seeks to be not only descriptive and exegetical, but also philosophical, it discusses the comparative merits of different views, the difficulties that they raise, and how some of the difficulties might be resolved. It presents the leading moral philosophers of the past as participants in a rational discussion in which the contemporary reader can participate.

lgrsnf/D:/!genesis/library.nu/e6/_267012.e66df7ca91f118bfe7407ede6063c168.pdf

lgli/D:/!genesis/library.nu/e6/_267012.e66df7ca91f118bfe7407ede6063c168.pdf

nexusstc/The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Volume 3: From Kant to Rawls/e66df7ca91f118bfe7407ede6063c168.pdf

The Development of Ethics: From Kant to Rawls v. 3

Irwin, Terence

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

OUP Oxford

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

Oxford, 2007-2009

1, 2009-11-23

1, PS, 2009

до 2011-01

lg460796

{"isbns":["0199571783","9780199571789"],"last_page":1056,"publisher":"Oxford University Press"}

Contents......Page 10
Abbreviations......Page 25
894. Strategy in Theoretical and Practical Philosophy......Page 30
895. Kant and Rationalism......Page 31
896. Kant and Sentimentalism......Page 32
897. Kant and Naturalism......Page 33
898. Meta-Ethical Consequences of Kant’s Strategy......Page 34
899. Normative Consequences......Page 36
900. Kant’s Tasks......Page 37
901. Form and Matter......Page 39
902. Practical Laws and Objective Ends......Page 40
903. Practical Laws and Categorical Imperatives......Page 41
904. Happiness and Desire......Page 42
905. Inclinations and Reasons......Page 43
906. The Status of Hypothetical Imperatives......Page 44
907. Self-Interest as a Source of Self-Love and Self-Conceit......Page 45
908. External Reasons and Universal Laws......Page 46
909. Happiness and the Highest Good......Page 47
910. Are There Practical Laws of Prudence?......Page 49
911. Practical Laws: A Dilemma for Kant......Page 50
912. The Good Will......Page 53
913. Praise, Blame, and Morality......Page 55
914. Acting from Duty......Page 56
915. The Scope of Moral Reasons......Page 59
916. The A Priori Character of Moral Principles......Page 60
917. The Idea and the Formulae of the Categorical Imperative......Page 61
918. Universal Law......Page 63
919. Rational Wills and Universal Law......Page 65
920. The Formula of Humanity......Page 67
921. Rational Beings as Objective Ends......Page 68
922. The Objective End and the Formula of Humanity......Page 70
923. How Can We Treat Rational Beings as Ends in Themselves?......Page 72
924. Humanity v. Personality......Page 74
925. The End-in-Itself and the Categorical Imperative......Page 76
926. ‘Spurious Principles of Morality’......Page 79
927. The Errors of Sentimentalism......Page 80
928. Morality and Non-Rational Motives......Page 83
929. Kant and Aristotle on Non-Rational Motives......Page 85
930. The Positive Role of Non-Rational Motives......Page 87
931. Objections to Rationalism......Page 90
932. Action and Virtue......Page 93
933. Duty, Law, and Virtue......Page 95
934. Objections to Traditional Naturalism......Page 98
935. The Final Good and Moral Rightness......Page 99
936. Differences Among the Ancients......Page 101
937. Naturalism, Eudaemonism, and Perfectionism......Page 103
938. The Significance of Naturalism for Kant’s Argument......Page 104
939. How can Freedom Justify Morality? The Fact of Reason......Page 106
940. Free Will, Practical Law, and Moral Law......Page 108
941. What does the Moral Law Reveal?......Page 109
942. Practical Reason and Practical Freedom......Page 110
943. Negative and Positive Freedom......Page 112
944. Degrees of Autonomy and Heteronomy......Page 114
945. Autonomy, Prudence, and Morality......Page 115
946. Why Should We Be Autonomous?......Page 117
947. Morality and Personality......Page 118
948. From Practical Freedom to Transcendental Freedom......Page 119
949. Objections to Kant’s Argument......Page 122
950. Phenomena and Noumena......Page 124
951. The Noumenal and the Practical......Page 125
952. Kant’s Solution......Page 127
953. Does Morality Require Noumenal Freedom?......Page 129
954. An Unsuccessful Defence of Freedom and Morality......Page 131
955. Negative and Positive Freedom v. Indeterminism......Page 132
956. Transcendental Idealism v. Voluntarism......Page 133
957. Does Autonomy Require Morality?......Page 135
958. Mutual Respect and the Predisposition to Personality......Page 136
959. Practical Reason and the Harmony of Ends......Page 137
960. Treating Persons as Ends: What Needs to be Proved......Page 138
961. First Argument from Freedom to Morality: Respect for Oneself and for Others......Page 139
962. Second Argument from Freedom to Morality: Non-Egocentric Reasons......Page 141
963. Significance of the Argument about Non-Egocentric Reasons......Page 142
964. Third Argument from Freedom to Morality: Extension of Practical Reason......Page 144
965. Treating Persons as Ends and the Basis of Morality......Page 146
966. The Effect of the Moral Law on the Non-Moral Self......Page 148
967. Some Moral Implications......Page 150
968. Autonomy and Kantian Morality......Page 153
969. Is Naturalism Compatible with Autonomy?......Page 154
970. The Errors of Eudaemonism about the Role of the Highest Good......Page 155
971. Kant v. Eudaemonism: The Priority of the Right to the Good......Page 156
972. Kant v. Eudaemonism: Holism and Justification......Page 158
973. How Traditional Naturalism Might Support Kant......Page 161
974. Elements of the Highest Good......Page 162
975. The Antinomy of Practical Reason......Page 164
976. Why Must We Aim at the Highest Good?......Page 166
977. Why Must We Be Able to Achieve the Highest Good?......Page 167
978. Morality, History, and God......Page 169
980. Practical Faith......Page 172
981. Some Meta-Ethical Implications of Kant’s Normative Theory......Page 176
982. Naturalism v. Transcendental Idealism......Page 177
983. Knowledge and Passivity......Page 179
984. Conditions for Autonomy: Law and Nature......Page 181
985. Aspects and Degrees of Autonomy......Page 182
986. Autonomy and Independent Judgment......Page 183
987. The Author of the Law v. the Author of the Obligation......Page 185
988. Laws, Imperatives, and Legislation......Page 186
989. Autonomy Without Legislation?......Page 188
990. Kant’s View of Disputes About Natural Law......Page 190
991. Autonomy Without Construction......Page 192
992. Heteronomy and the Spurious Principles of Morality......Page 193
993. Kantian Constructivism......Page 195
994. Does Autonomy Require Construction?......Page 197
995. Objections to a Constructivist Account of Autonomy......Page 198
996. A Constructivist Revision of Kant?......Page 199
997. Ethics and the History of Ethics......Page 202
998. Normative Theory and Critical Morality......Page 204
999. Critical Morality and Comprehension of the Actual......Page 205
1000. Historical and Analytic Approaches to Morality......Page 208
1002. The Will and Freedom......Page 211
1003. The Free Will and its Objects......Page 214
1004. Content for the Free Will......Page 216
1005. Classical Greek Ethics......Page 217
1006. Moral Theory and Classical Greek Society......Page 218
1007. Later Antiquity......Page 220
1008. Ancient and Mediaeval......Page 221
1009. Hegel’s Criticism of Eudaemonism......Page 222
1010. Eudaemonism v. Freedom......Page 223
1012. Defences of Hegel on Eudaemonism......Page 225
1013. Eudaemonism in Hegel’s Argument......Page 227
1014. Hedonism......Page 229
1015. Hedonism and Utility......Page 231
1016. Hedonism and Practical Reason......Page 232
1017. Utilitarianism and Civil Society......Page 234
1018. From Abstract Right to Kantian Morality......Page 236
1020. Kant and Enlightenment......Page 238
1021. The Emptiness of Kantian Morality......Page 240
1022. Kantian Dualism and the Examination of Motives......Page 244
1023. Is Kantian Dualism Incoherent?......Page 245
1024. Purpose and Success in Kantian Morality......Page 247
1025. The Truth in Kantian Morality......Page 249
1026. The Value of Hegel’s Criticism of Kant......Page 251
1027. Primitive Ethical Life......Page 252
1028. Conscious Ethical Life......Page 255
1029. Subjective and Objective Elements of Ethical Life......Page 257
1030. The Place of Critical Morality in Ethical Life......Page 258
1031. Hegel and His Successors......Page 261
1032. Reactions to Hegel......Page 264
1033. Difficulties in Hegel’s View of the State......Page 265
1034. Marx’s Answer to Difficulties in Hegel......Page 266
1035. Marx’s Rejection of Moral Criticism......Page 268
1036. The Replacement of Morality?......Page 270
1037. The Evils of Capitalism......Page 271
1038. Capitalism and Human Nature......Page 273
1039. The Moral Status of Marx’s Criticism......Page 276
1040. Marx’s Vindication of Morality......Page 278
1041. Aristotelian and Kantian Theories......Page 279
1042. Marx, Kant, and History......Page 280
1043. Schopenhauer and Kant......Page 282
1044. Eudaemonism......Page 283
1045. Moral Motivation......Page 285
1046. Duty and Inclination......Page 287
1047. Egoism and Morality......Page 288
1048. Laws and Imperatives in Kant......Page 290
1049. The Character of the Categorical Imperative......Page 293
1050. Kant and Rationalism......Page 295
1051. Self-Interest and the Formula of Universal Law......Page 296
1052. The Formula of Humanity......Page 298
1053. Kant’s Egoism and the Highest Good......Page 299
1054. Sources of Egoism......Page 300
1055. The Relevance of Compassion......Page 301
1056. The Importance of Compassion......Page 304
1057. Compassion and Metaphysics......Page 307
1058. Metaphysical Objections to Morality......Page 309
1059. Criticisms of Kant on Freedom......Page 310
1060. Morality and Freedom......Page 312
1061. Implications of Schopenhauer’s Views......Page 314
1062. Different Conceptions of the Moral Point of View......Page 316
1063. Morality and Reason......Page 317
1064. The Imperative Aspect of Morality......Page 318
1065. Freedom and the Ethical Outlook......Page 319
1066. The Aesthetic Outlook......Page 320
1067. Differences between Kierkegaard and Hume......Page 321
1068. Similarities between Kierkegaard and Hume......Page 322
1069. An Objection to Hume......Page 324
1070. The Aesthetic Attitude v. Rational Prudence......Page 325
1071. The Differences between the Aesthetic and the Ethical Outlook......Page 326
1072. Aesthetic Agency and Despair......Page 328
1073. Freedom......Page 329
1074. The Ethical Outlook and Objectivity......Page 332
1075. Does Ethical Agency Require Morality?......Page 334
1076. How Are We Free to Choose Ourselves?......Page 335
1078. Rejection of Pagan Virtue......Page 337
1079. Inadequate Accounts of Faith......Page 338
1080. Why Faith Suspends the Ethical......Page 341
1081. Morality in the Light of Faith......Page 342
1082. The Errors in Pagan Virtue......Page 344
1083. Selfish Conceptions of Love......Page 345
1084. Universal Love......Page 348
1085. Questions about Kierkegaard’s Voluntarism......Page 350
1086. Is Christian Love Absurd?......Page 351
1087. The Criticism of Morality......Page 354
1088. Against Moral Facts......Page 355
1089. Moral and Non-Moral Values......Page 358
1090. Why a Historical Approach?......Page 359
1091. The Social Origin of Morals......Page 360
1092. Master Morality......Page 362
1093. Slave Morality......Page 365
1094. The Hellenic Outlook in the Culture of the Sophists......Page 367
1095. The Un-Hellenic Outlook of Socrates and Plato......Page 370
1096. Immoralism and Traditional Morality......Page 373
1097. Relativism, Nihilism, and Traditional Morality......Page 374
1098. The Rise of Social Morality......Page 376
1099. Objectivism and Traditional Morality......Page 379
1100. For and Against Nietzsche......Page 380
1101. The Survival of Slave Morality......Page 381
1102. Genealogy and Justification......Page 382
1103. The Subjectivist Critique of Morality......Page 384
1104. An Objectivist Critique of Morality......Page 386
1105. Reasonable Aspects of Nietzsche’s Criticism......Page 389
1106. The Value of Nietzsche’s Questions......Page 390
1107. Mill, Bentham, and their Predecessors......Page 393
1108. Whewell on Voluntarism and Utilitarianism......Page 394
1109. Mill’s Version of the History of Utilitarianism......Page 395
1110. Bentham’s Contributions......Page 398
1111. Is the Principle of Utility Practically Unimportant?......Page 399
1112. How is the Principle of Utility Practically Important?......Page 401
1113. Objections to Bentham......Page 402
1114. Bentham on Pleasure and Motivation......Page 404
1115. Godwin’s Extreme Utilitarianism......Page 406
1116. Godwin’s Defence of Utilitarianism......Page 408
1117. Objections to Godwin......Page 411
1118. Godwin as an Alternative to Bentham......Page 413
1119. Whewell’s Principles......Page 414
1120. Mill on Whewell’s ‘Vicious Circles’......Page 417
1121. Whewell on Happiness and Pleasure......Page 419
1122. Whewell’s Objections to Utilitarian Calculation......Page 421
1123. Which Consequences?......Page 422
1124. Whose Pleasures?......Page 423
1125. Whewell’s Alleged Utilitarianism......Page 424
1126. A New Defence of Utilitarianism......Page 427
1127. Utilitarianism and Quality of Pleasure......Page 428
1128. Difficulties about Quality of Pleasure......Page 430
1129. Does Mill Abandon Utilitarianism?......Page 431
1130. Quality of Pleasure and the Standard of Morality......Page 432
1131. The Composition of Happiness......Page 433
1132. Hedonism v. Eudaemonism in Mill......Page 434
1133. Utilitarianism and Liberty......Page 437
1134. Aristotelian Naturalism in Mill......Page 438
1135. Utilitarianism and Common-Sense Morality......Page 440
1136. Indirect Utilitarianism and Common-Sense Morality......Page 442
1137. The Proof of Utilitarianism......Page 444
1138. Utilitarianism and Justice......Page 447
1139. Justice, Equality, and Utility......Page 449
1140. Mill and Ward on Utilitarianism and Theological Voluntarism......Page 451
1141. Does Mill Really Defend Utilitarianism?......Page 453
1142. Utilitarianism and Sidgwick’s Moral Philosophy......Page 455
1143. Sidgwick and Greek Ethics......Page 456
1144. The Failures of Greek Ethics and the Task of the Moralist......Page 458
1145. Butler on Human Nature......Page 459
1146. Butler on Practical Reason......Page 460
1147. The Rejection of Sentimentalism......Page 461
1148. For and Against Rationalism......Page 462
1149. The Kantian Basis of Utilitarianism......Page 463
1150. Earlier Utilitarianism......Page 464
1151. Objections to Mill......Page 465
1152. Sidgwick and Other Historians......Page 467
1153. The Study of Methods......Page 468
1154. What is a Method?......Page 469
1155. The Moral ‘Ought’......Page 470
1156. Subjectivism and Definition......Page 472
1157. The Indefinability of ‘Ought’......Page 474
1158. The Categorical ‘Ought’......Page 476
1159. What Methods are There?......Page 477
1160. What Makes a Distinct Method?......Page 480
1161. What is ‘Ultimately Reasonable’?......Page 482
1162. Psychological Hedonism......Page 484
1163. Psychological Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism......Page 485
1164. Hedonism and Eudaemonism......Page 486
1165. Prudential Hedonism......Page 487
1166. Hedonism and Foundationalism......Page 491
1167. Is Egoism a Method of Ethics?......Page 493
1168. The Importance of Hedonism......Page 494
1169. Strategies of Argument......Page 495
1170. Deontological Morality and the Intuitional Method......Page 496
1171. Dogmatic v. Philosophical Intuitionism......Page 498
1172. Intuitionism and Common-Sense Morality......Page 499
1173. The Review of Common-Sense Morality......Page 500
1174. Common Sense: Advantages of Utilitarianism......Page 501
1175. Conficts between Common Sense and Utilitarianism......Page 503
1176. Common Sense: Actions and Reasons......Page 504
1177. Moral Theories and Definite Answers......Page 508
1178. Utilitarianism and Definite Answers......Page 509
1179. Definite Answers and Practical Difficulties......Page 510
1180. Common-Sense Objections to Quantitative Hedonism......Page 514
1181. Limitations of the Dialectical Strategy......Page 517
1182. The Axiomatic Strategy and Dialectical Argument......Page 518
1184. The Defects of Dogmatic Intuitionism......Page 519
1185. The Axioms of Equity and Benevolence......Page 521
1186. Do the Axioms Support Utilitarianism?......Page 523
1187. A Revised Axiom of Prudence......Page 525
1188. Prudence and Maximization......Page 527
1189. The Derivation of Utilitarianism......Page 528
1190. The Development of the Argument......Page 530
1191. Has Sidgwick Justified Prudence?......Page 531
1192. Rawls’s Objections......Page 534
1193. Prudence and the Self......Page 535
1194. A Puzzle about Prudence and the Self......Page 536
1195. Persons, Wholes, and Distribution......Page 539
1196. Prudence and Benevolence......Page 541
1197. Utilitarianism and Equality......Page 542
1198. An Objection Derived from Equality......Page 543
1199. The ‘Synthesis’ of Utilitarianism and Intuitionism......Page 545
1200. Egoism and the Ultimately Reasonable......Page 547
1201. Why is There a Dualism of Practical Reason?......Page 549
1202. Egoism and ‘Reasonable for Me’......Page 551
1203. Agent-Relative Reasons?......Page 554
1204. Why Does the Dualism Matter?......Page 556
1205. How Should the Dualism be Resolved?......Page 557
1206. Questions about Sidgwick’s Dualism......Page 558
1207. Prospects for Utilitarianism: Conservative Defences......Page 560
1208. Prospects for Utilitarianism: Revisionary Defences......Page 562
1209. Ideal Utilitarianism......Page 563
1210. The British Idealists......Page 565
1211. The Impact of Idealism......Page 566
1212. Differences Between Bradley and Green......Page 568
1213. Free Will, Responsibility, and the Self......Page 569
1214. Why Should I be Moral?......Page 573
1215. Introduction of Self-Realization......Page 576
1216. Self-Realization and the Moral Outlook......Page 577
1217. Self-Realization in Rational Action......Page 579
1218. Realizing the Self as a Whole......Page 581
1219. Realizing Selves by Realizing Capacities......Page 582
1220. Realizing Selves as Infinite Wholes......Page 583
1221. Errors about Self-Realization......Page 585
1222. Utilitarianism......Page 587
1223. Criticism of Kant......Page 590
1224. Emptiness......Page 591
1225. Dualism......Page 594
1226. My Station and its Duties: Reconciliation of Morality with Self-Realization?......Page 596
1227. Different Roles of my Station and its Duties......Page 598
1228. Self-Realization and True Morality......Page 599
1229. The Good Self......Page 600
1230. Being a Whole by Joining a Whole......Page 601
1231. Morality and Ends......Page 604
1232. Kantian Morality and Self-Realization......Page 605
1233. The Scope of Morality......Page 608
1234. Green and Bradley on the History of Ethics......Page 610
1235. The Self and the Will......Page 612
1236. Self-Satisfaction and Self-Identification......Page 614
1237. Degrees of Self-Identification......Page 616
1238. Self-Realization and the Errors of Hedonism......Page 619
1239. Does Utilitarianism Require Hedonism?......Page 622
1240. Does Non-Hedonist Utilitarianism Answer Green?......Page 623
1241. Green’s Defence of Kant......Page 626
1242. Green’s Appeal to Greek Ethics......Page 631
1243. Green’s View of the Aristotelian Virtues......Page 634
1244. Aristotle on the Fine and the Virtues......Page 636
1245. The Self and the Common Good......Page 639
1246. The Development of Concern for the Common Good......Page 641
1247. The Non-Competitive Common Good......Page 642
1248. The Common Good, Utilitarianism, and Kant......Page 644
1249. The Composition of the Common Good......Page 647
1250. Kant and Idealism......Page 651
1251. Moore and Sidgwick......Page 654
1252. Compositional Definitions......Page 655
1253. Real Definitions......Page 657
1254. What is the Naturalistic Fallacy?......Page 658
1255. Who Commits the Naturalistic Fallacy?......Page 659
1256. The Open Question Argument......Page 661
1257. Does the Open Question Argument Show that Good is Indefinable?......Page 662
1258. When is a Question Open?......Page 663
1259. Objections to Some Naturalist Definitions of Good......Page 665
1260. Moore’s Second Thoughts......Page 668
1261. Natural Properties and Intrinsic Properties......Page 670
1262. Descriptive v. Non-Descriptive Properties......Page 671
1263. Why is Ethics Not a Natural Science?......Page 672
1264. Evaluative Properties and Non-Natural Properties......Page 673
1265. The Open Question Argument and Real Definitions......Page 674
1266. Does Non-Naturalism Require Intuitionism?......Page 676
1267. Non-Naturalism and Holism......Page 678
1268. Conceptual Utilitarianism and the Open Question Argument......Page 679
1269. Conceptual Utilitarianism and Ethical Argument......Page 681
1270. Value, Normativity, and Obligation: Frankena on Moore......Page 682
1271. Why Utilitarianism?......Page 684
1272. Intrinsic Value......Page 686
1273. Intrinsic Goods and Egoism......Page 688
1274. Ross and Intuitionism......Page 691
1275. Doubts about the Open Question Argument......Page 692
1276. Indefinability......Page 694
1277. Objections to Naturalism......Page 695
1278. Explications......Page 696
1279. Objections to Non-Natural Properties......Page 698
1280. Non-Natural Properties, Facts, and Values......Page 699
1281. A Defence of Non-Natural Properties......Page 701
1282. The Property of Rightness v. the Right-Making Property......Page 703
1283. The Relevance of Properties to Moral Inquiry......Page 704
1284. Ross v. Socrates on Explanatory Properties......Page 706
1285. Ross v. Moore on Properties......Page 707
1286. Arguments about the Right-Making Property......Page 708
1287. How Does Ross Argue Against Utilitarianism?......Page 710
1288. Utilitarianism and Self-Evidence......Page 713
1289. Should Ross Reject Intuitionism?......Page 715
1290. Intuitionism v. Holism......Page 716
1291. An Argument for Holism......Page 717
1292. Intuitionism as Pluralism......Page 719
1293. Moore and Non-Cognitivism......Page 721
1294. The Logical Empiricist Ideal of Scientific Knowledge......Page 722
1295. Strict v. Moderate Empiricism......Page 723
1296. Empiricism and Ethics......Page 724
1297. Facts and Values: Weber......Page 725
1298. Facts and Standards: Popper......Page 727
1299. Moore, Hume, and Non-Cognitivism......Page 729
1300. Stevenson’s Analysis......Page 730
1301. Intelligent Disagreement......Page 732
1302. Stevenson’s Conditions for Adequate Definition......Page 733
1303. Can Stevenson Accept the Open Question Argument?......Page 735
1304. Can Stevenson Do Without Moore?......Page 736
1305. The ‘Magnetism’ of Moral Judgments......Page 737
1306. Moore’s Criticism of Stevenson......Page 739
1307. Hare’s Criticism of Stevenson......Page 740
1308. Implications of Moore’s and Hare’s Objections......Page 741
1309. Emotivism and Meaning......Page 742
1310. The Inadequacy of an Emotivist Analysis......Page 744
1311. Emotivism and Analytic Truth......Page 745
1312. Does Emotivism Discredit Morality?......Page 747
1313. Does it Matter if Emotivism Discredits Morality?......Page 749
1314. Emotivism, Scepticism, and Nihilism......Page 750
1315. Lewis as a Naturalist......Page 753
1316. The Error in Non-Cognitivism......Page 756
1317. Objectivity......Page 757
1318. What are Evaluative Judgments About?......Page 759
1319. Terminating Judgments and Objective Judgments......Page 760
1320. Empiricism and Ethics......Page 764
1321. Norms and Rationality......Page 765
1322. Synthetic Intuitions about Value......Page 768
1323. The Moral Point of View......Page 770
1324. Hare’s Aims......Page 775
1325. Conditions of Adequacy......Page 777
1326. Prescriptivism v. Emotivism......Page 779
1327. Hare’s Reconstruction of Moore......Page 781
1328. Commendatory Function......Page 783
1329. Evaluative Use Without Prescriptive Meaning?......Page 784
1330. Moral Judgments, Reasons, and Prescriptions......Page 785
1331. Is Hare’s Position Consistent?......Page 788
1332. Non-Naturalism and Intuitionism......Page 789
1333. Argument from the Neutrality of Moral Language to Prescriptivism......Page 792
1334. Disagreement, Argument, and Reform......Page 794
1335. Further Options for Cognitivism......Page 796
1336. Universalizability......Page 798
1337. Are Moral Principles Overriding?......Page 799
1338. Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism......Page 802
1339. Utilitarianism Derived from Preferences......Page 804
1340. Preferences and Probabilities......Page 806
1341. Preferences v. Prescriptions......Page 807
1342. The Gap Between Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism......Page 810
1343. Ethical Relevance......Page 813
1344. Motivation for Existentialism......Page 815
1345. The Starting Point......Page 816
1346. Human Beings and the World......Page 820
1347. Being in the World......Page 822
1348. Equipment and Environment......Page 823
1349. Objections to Descartes......Page 825
1350. A Voluntarist Objection to Descartes......Page 827
1351. Questions about Heidegger’s Objections to Descartes......Page 828
1352. Self and Others......Page 830
1353. Care......Page 832
1354. The ‘They’......Page 835
1355. Moods, Affects, and Being-In......Page 837
1356. The They and its Idle Talk......Page 839
1357. Falling and Authenticity......Page 841
1358. Anxiety......Page 842
1359. Authenticity and the Errors of Traditional Ontology......Page 844
1360. Authenticity, Facts, and Values......Page 845
1361. Should the Open Question Argument be Revived?......Page 848
1362. Moore and Normativity......Page 849
1363. Supervenience and Objectivist Non-Naturalism......Page 851
1364. Gibbard’s Argument for Non-Cognitivism......Page 853
1365. Objections to Gibbard’s Account......Page 855
1366. An Evolutionary Argument for Non-Cognitivism......Page 856
1367. The Appeal of Quasi-Realism......Page 858
1368. Quasi-Realism on Conditionals......Page 860
1369. Quasi-Realism on Counterfactuals and Independence......Page 862
1370. What Should We Expect from Quasi-Realism?......Page 864
1371. Non-Cognitivism v. Nihilism......Page 865
1372. Further Attacks on Objectivism......Page 867
1373. What Difference Does Objectivity Make?......Page 869
1374. Are Moral Judgments Essentially Prescriptive?......Page 871
1375. What is Wrong with Objective Prescriptivity?......Page 874
1376. Supervenience......Page 875
1377. What is Wrong with Queerness?......Page 876
1379. Relativity and Disagreement......Page 878
1380. A Place for Morality Without Objectivity......Page 881
1381. How Should We Replace Morality?......Page 884
1382. Are Moral Concepts Natural?......Page 886
1383. Are Moral Properties Natural?......Page 887
1384. Varieties of Objectivism......Page 890
1385. Objectivism and Justification......Page 893
1386. Implications for Normative Ethics?......Page 894
1387. Objectivism and Dogmatism......Page 895
1388. Implications for Moral Theory?......Page 897
1389. Attitudes to Naturalism......Page 898
1390. Naturalism Without the Naturalistic Fallacy......Page 899
1391. Morality and Motivation......Page 900
1392. Naturalism, Facts, and Values......Page 901
1393. Naturalism and Conceptions of Nature......Page 902
1394. Naturalism as Metaphysical Biology......Page 903
1395. Does Naturalism Need Metaphysical Biology?......Page 904
1396. Naturalism and Teleology......Page 906
1397. Objections to Naturalism Without Metaphysical Biology......Page 907
1398. Naturalism and Real Interests......Page 909
1399. The Connexion Between Nature and Well-Being......Page 910
1400. Moral Objections to Naturalism......Page 912
1401. Moral Arguments for Naturalism......Page 915
1402. Moral and Non-Moral Aspects of Naturalism......Page 917
1403. Rawls and his Predecessors......Page 921
1404. A Systematic Alternative to Utilitarianism......Page 922
1405. The Social Contract Tradition......Page 924
1406. A Defence of Kant......Page 925
1407. Method and Justification......Page 926
1408. Considered Judgments......Page 928
1409. Moral Theory and Linguistic Theory......Page 929
1410. Ought We to Pursue Reflective Equilibrium?......Page 930
1411. Is the Pursuit of Reflective Equilibrium Consistent with Objectivism?......Page 933
1412. The Rejection of Intuitionism......Page 935
1413. What Should Rawls Prove about Justice?......Page 936
1414. Why the Original Position?......Page 937
1415. Justice, Fairness, and the Original Position......Page 938
1416. Arguments for Fairness......Page 939
1417. The Point of the Original Position......Page 941
1418. The Strategy of Argument......Page 943
1419. Moral Constraints on the Original Position......Page 944
1420. Knowledge and Motivation in the Original Position......Page 946
1421. Mutual Disinterest......Page 948
1422. The Good v. Primary Goods......Page 949
1423. Aversion to Risk......Page 952
1424. Utilitarian Objections to the Original Position......Page 955
1425. Doubts about Rawls’s Strategy......Page 956
1426. The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness......Page 960
1427. Freedom and Equality......Page 962
1428. Why Accept a Kantian Doctrine of Equality?......Page 964
1429. Are the Principles of Justice Categorical Imperatives?......Page 966
1430. The Significance of the Kantian Interpretation......Page 968
1431. Self-Respect v. Self-Esteem......Page 970
1432. How Kant Might Support Rawls......Page 972
1433. The Priority of the Right over the Good......Page 973
1434. A Subjectivist Conception of the Good......Page 974
1435. Doubts about Rawls’s Subjectivist Account of the Good......Page 975
1436. The Diversity of Goods......Page 977
1437. Primary Goods and the Priority of the Right......Page 978
1438. Primary Goods, Freedom, and Equality......Page 980
1439. Self-Realization and Treating Oneself as an End......Page 982
1440. Self-Realization and Morality......Page 984
1442. Constructivism in Moral and Political Philosophy......Page 985
1443. Political v. Moral Constructivism......Page 988
1444. ‘Kantian’ Constructivism v. Objectivism......Page 989
Bibliography......Page 991
B......Page 1034
C......Page 1035
D......Page 1036
F......Page 1037
H......Page 1038
J......Page 1040
L......Page 1041
M......Page 1042
O......Page 1043
P......Page 1044
R......Page 1045
S......Page 1046
U......Page 1048
W......Page 1049

Contents 10
Abbreviations 25
66. Kant: Practical Laws 30
894. Strategy in Theoretical and Practical Philosophy 30
895. Kant and Rationalism 31
896. Kant and Sentimentalism 32
897. Kant and Naturalism 33
898. Meta-Ethical Consequences of Kant’s Strategy 34
899. Normative Consequences 36
900. Kant’s Tasks 37
901. Form and Matter 39
902. Practical Laws and Objective Ends 40
903. Practical Laws and Categorical Imperatives 41
904. Happiness and Desire 42
905. Inclinations and Reasons 43
906. The Status of Hypothetical Imperatives 44
907. Self-Interest as a Source of Self-Love and Self-Conceit 45
908. External Reasons and Universal Laws 46
909. Happiness and the Highest Good 47
910. Are There Practical Laws of Prudence? 49
911. Practical Laws: A Dilemma for Kant 50
67. Kant: From Practical Laws to Morality 53
912. The Good Will 53
913. Praise, Blame, and Morality 55
914. Acting from Duty 56
915. The Scope of Moral Reasons 59
916. The A Priori Character of Moral Principles 60
917. The Idea and the Formulae of the Categorical Imperative 61
918. Universal Law 63
919. Rational Wills and Universal Law 65
920. The Formula of Humanity 67
921. Rational Beings as Objective Ends 68
922. The Objective End and the Formula of Humanity 70
923. How Can We Treat Rational Beings as Ends in Themselves? 72
924. Humanity v. Personality 74
925. The End-in-Itself and the Categorical Imperative 76
68. Kant: Some Objections and Replies 79
926. ‘Spurious Principles of Morality’ 79
927. The Errors of Sentimentalism 80
928. Morality and Non-Rational Motives 83
929. Kant and Aristotle on Non-Rational Motives 85
930. The Positive Role of Non-Rational Motives 87
931. Objections to Rationalism 90
932. Action and Virtue 93
933. Duty, Law, and Virtue 95
934. Objections to Traditional Naturalism 98
935. The Final Good and Moral Rightness 99
936. Differences Among the Ancients 101
937. Naturalism, Eudaemonism, and Perfectionism 103
938. The Significance of Naturalism for Kant’s Argument 104
69. Kant: Freedom 106
939. How can Freedom Justify Morality? The Fact of Reason 106
940. Free Will, Practical Law, and Moral Law 108
941. What does the Moral Law Reveal? 109
942. Practical Reason and Practical Freedom 110
943. Negative and Positive Freedom 112
944. Degrees of Autonomy and Heteronomy 114
945. Autonomy, Prudence, and Morality 115
946. Why Should We Be Autonomous? 117
947. Morality and Personality 118
948. From Practical Freedom to Transcendental Freedom 119
949. Objections to Kant’s Argument 122
950. Phenomena and Noumena 124
951. The Noumenal and the Practical 125
952. Kant’s Solution 127
953. Does Morality Require Noumenal Freedom? 129
954. An Unsuccessful Defence of Freedom and Morality 131
955. Negative and Positive Freedom v. Indeterminism 132
956. Transcendental Idealism v. Voluntarism 133
70. Kant: From Freedom to Morality 135
957. Does Autonomy Require Morality? 135
958. Mutual Respect and the Predisposition to Personality 136
959. Practical Reason and the Harmony of Ends 137
960. Treating Persons as Ends: What Needs to be Proved 138
961. First Argument from Freedom to Morality: Respect for Oneself and for Others 139
962. Second Argument from Freedom to Morality: Non-Egocentric Reasons 141
963. Significance of the Argument about Non-Egocentric Reasons 142
964. Third Argument from Freedom to Morality: Extension of Practical Reason 144
965. Treating Persons as Ends and the Basis of Morality 146
966. The Effect of the Moral Law on the Non-Moral Self 148
967. Some Moral Implications 150
71. Kant: Morality and the Good 153
968. Autonomy and Kantian Morality 153
969. Is Naturalism Compatible with Autonomy? 154
970. The Errors of Eudaemonism about the Role of the Highest Good 155
971. Kant v. Eudaemonism: The Priority of the Right to the Good 156
972. Kant v. Eudaemonism: Holism and Justification 158
973. How Traditional Naturalism Might Support Kant 161
974. Elements of the Highest Good 162
975. The Antinomy of Practical Reason 164
976. Why Must We Aim at the Highest Good? 166
977. Why Must We Be Able to Achieve the Highest Good? 167
978. Morality, History, and God 169
979. The Highest Good and the Existence of God 172
980. Practical Faith 172
72. Kant: Meta-Ethical Questions 176
981. Some Meta-Ethical Implications of Kant’s Normative Theory 176
982. Naturalism v. Transcendental Idealism 177
983. Knowledge and Passivity 179
984. Conditions for Autonomy: Law and Nature 181
985. Aspects and Degrees of Autonomy 182
986. Autonomy and Independent Judgment 183
987. The Author of the Law v. the Author of the Obligation 185
988. Laws, Imperatives, and Legislation 186
989. Autonomy Without Legislation? 188
990. Kant’s View of Disputes About Natural Law 190
991. Autonomy Without Construction 192
992. Heteronomy and the Spurious Principles of Morality 193
993. Kantian Constructivism 195
994. Does Autonomy Require Construction? 197
995. Objections to a Constructivist Account of Autonomy 198
996. A Constructivist Revision of Kant? 199
73. Hegel: History and Theory 202
997. Ethics and the History of Ethics 202
998. Normative Theory and Critical Morality 204
999. Critical Morality and Comprehension of the Actual 205
1000. Historical and Analytic Approaches to Morality 208
1001. Hegel and Idealist Moral Philosophy 211
1002. The Will and Freedom 211
1003. The Free Will and its Objects 214
1004. Content for the Free Will 216
1005. Classical Greek Ethics 217
1006. Moral Theory and Classical Greek Society 218
1007. Later Antiquity 220
1008. Ancient and Mediaeval 221
1009. Hegel’s Criticism of Eudaemonism 222
1010. Eudaemonism v. Freedom 223
1011. Doubts about Hegel on Eudaemonism 225
1012. Defences of Hegel on Eudaemonism 225
1013. Eudaemonism in Hegel’s Argument 227
74. Hegel: Morality and Beyond 229
1014. Hedonism 229
1015. Hedonism and Utility 231
1016. Hedonism and Practical Reason 232
1017. Utilitarianism and Civil Society 234
1018. From Abstract Right to Kantian Morality 236
1019. Morality within Abstract Right? 238
1020. Kant and Enlightenment 238
1021. The Emptiness of Kantian Morality 240
1022. Kantian Dualism and the Examination of Motives 244
1023. Is Kantian Dualism Incoherent? 245
1024. Purpose and Success in Kantian Morality 247
1025. The Truth in Kantian Morality 249
1026. The Value of Hegel’s Criticism of Kant 251
1027. Primitive Ethical Life 252
1028. Conscious Ethical Life 255
1029. Subjective and Objective Elements of Ethical Life 257
1030. The Place of Critical Morality in Ethical Life 258
1031. Hegel and His Successors 261
75. Marx and Idealist Moral Theory 264
1032. Reactions to Hegel 264
1033. Difficulties in Hegel’s View of the State 265
1034. Marx’s Answer to Difficulties in Hegel 266
1035. Marx’s Rejection of Moral Criticism 268
1036. The Replacement of Morality? 270
1037. The Evils of Capitalism 271
1038. Capitalism and Human Nature 273
1039. The Moral Status of Marx’s Criticism 276
1040. Marx’s Vindication of Morality 278
1041. Aristotelian and Kantian Theories 279
1042. Marx, Kant, and History 280
76. Schopenhauer 282
1043. Schopenhauer and Kant 282
1044. Eudaemonism 283
1045. Moral Motivation 285
1046. Duty and Inclination 287
1047. Egoism and Morality 288
1048. Laws and Imperatives in Kant 290
1049. The Character of the Categorical Imperative 293
1050. Kant and Rationalism 295
1051. Self-Interest and the Formula of Universal Law 296
1052. The Formula of Humanity 298
1053. Kant’s Egoism and the Highest Good 299
1054. Sources of Egoism 300
1055. The Relevance of Compassion 301
1056. The Importance of Compassion 304
1057. Compassion and Metaphysics 307
1058. Metaphysical Objections to Morality 309
1059. Criticisms of Kant on Freedom 310
1060. Morality and Freedom 312
1061. Implications of Schopenhauer’s Views 314
77. Kierkegaard 316
1062. Different Conceptions of the Moral Point of View 316
1063. Morality and Reason 317
1064. The Imperative Aspect of Morality 318
1065. Freedom and the Ethical Outlook 319
1066. The Aesthetic Outlook 320
1067. Differences between Kierkegaard and Hume 321
1068. Similarities between Kierkegaard and Hume 322
1069. An Objection to Hume 324
1070. The Aesthetic Attitude v. Rational Prudence 325
1071. The Differences between the Aesthetic and the Ethical Outlook 326
1072. Aesthetic Agency and Despair 328
1073. Freedom 329
1074. The Ethical Outlook and Objectivity 332
1075. Does Ethical Agency Require Morality? 334
1076. How Are We Free to Choose Ourselves? 335
1077. How Kantian is Kierkegaard? 337
1078. Rejection of Pagan Virtue 337
1079. Inadequate Accounts of Faith 338
1080. Why Faith Suspends the Ethical 341
1081. Morality in the Light of Faith 342
1082. The Errors in Pagan Virtue 344
1083. Selfish Conceptions of Love 345
1084. Universal Love 348
1085. Questions about Kierkegaard’s Voluntarism 350
1086. Is Christian Love Absurd? 351
78. Nietzsche 354
1087. The Criticism of Morality 354
1088. Against Moral Facts 355
1089. Moral and Non-Moral Values 358
1090. Why a Historical Approach? 359
1091. The Social Origin of Morals 360
1092. Master Morality 362
1093. Slave Morality 365
1094. The Hellenic Outlook in the Culture of the Sophists 367
1095. The Un-Hellenic Outlook of Socrates and Plato 370
1096. Immoralism and Traditional Morality 373
1097. Relativism, Nihilism, and Traditional Morality 374
1098. The Rise of Social Morality 376
1099. Objectivism and Traditional Morality 379
1100. For and Against Nietzsche 380
1101. The Survival of Slave Morality 381
1102. Genealogy and Justification 382
1103. The Subjectivist Critique of Morality 384
1104. An Objectivist Critique of Morality 386
1105. Reasonable Aspects of Nietzsche’s Criticism 389
1106. The Value of Nietzsche’s Questions 390
79. Mill: Earlier Utilitarianism and its Critics 393
1107. Mill, Bentham, and their Predecessors 393
1108. Whewell on Voluntarism and Utilitarianism 394
1109. Mill’s Version of the History of Utilitarianism 395
1110. Bentham’s Contributions 398
1111. Is the Principle of Utility Practically Unimportant? 399
1112. How is the Principle of Utility Practically Important? 401
1113. Objections to Bentham 402
1114. Bentham on Pleasure and Motivation 404
1115. Godwin’s Extreme Utilitarianism 406
1116. Godwin’s Defence of Utilitarianism 408
1117. Objections to Godwin 411
1118. Godwin as an Alternative to Bentham 413
1119. Whewell’s Principles 414
1120. Mill on Whewell’s ‘Vicious Circles’ 417
1121. Whewell on Happiness and Pleasure 419
1122. Whewell’s Objections to Utilitarian Calculation 421
1123. Which Consequences? 422
1124. Whose Pleasures? 423
1125. Whewell’s Alleged Utilitarianism 424
80. Mill: A Revised Version of Utilitarianism 427
1126. A New Defence of Utilitarianism 427
1127. Utilitarianism and Quality of Pleasure 428
1128. Difficulties about Quality of Pleasure 430
1129. Does Mill Abandon Utilitarianism? 431
1130. Quality of Pleasure and the Standard of Morality 432
1131. The Composition of Happiness 433
1132. Hedonism v. Eudaemonism in Mill 434
1133. Utilitarianism and Liberty 437
1134. Aristotelian Naturalism in Mill 438
1135. Utilitarianism and Common-Sense Morality 440
1136. Indirect Utilitarianism and Common-Sense Morality 442
1137. The Proof of Utilitarianism 444
1138. Utilitarianism and Justice 447
1139. Justice, Equality, and Utility 449
1140. Mill and Ward on Utilitarianism and Theological Voluntarism 451
1141. Does Mill Really Defend Utilitarianism? 453
81. Sidgwick: Methods and Sources 455
1142. Utilitarianism and Sidgwick’s Moral Philosophy 455
1143. Sidgwick and Greek Ethics 456
1144. The Failures of Greek Ethics and the Task of the Moralist 458
1145. Butler on Human Nature 459
1146. Butler on Practical Reason 460
1147. The Rejection of Sentimentalism 461
1148. For and Against Rationalism 462
1149. The Kantian Basis of Utilitarianism 463
1150. Earlier Utilitarianism 464
1151. Objections to Mill 465
1152. Sidgwick and Other Historians 467
1153. The Study of Methods 468
1154. What is a Method? 469
1155. The Moral ‘Ought’ 470
1156. Subjectivism and Definition 472
1157. The Indefinability of ‘Ought’ 474
1158. The Categorical ‘Ought’ 476
1159. What Methods are There? 477
1160. What Makes a Distinct Method? 480
1161. What is ‘Ultimately Reasonable’? 482
82. Sidgwick: The Examination of Methods 484
1162. Psychological Hedonism 484
1163. Psychological Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism 485
1164. Hedonism and Eudaemonism 486
1165. Prudential Hedonism 487
1166. Hedonism and Foundationalism 491
1167. Is Egoism a Method of Ethics? 493
1168. The Importance of Hedonism 494
1169. Strategies of Argument 495
1170. Deontological Morality and the Intuitional Method 496
1171. Dogmatic v. Philosophical Intuitionism 498
1172. Intuitionism and Common-Sense Morality 499
1173. The Review of Common-Sense Morality 500
1174. Common Sense: Advantages of Utilitarianism 501
1175. Conficts between Common Sense and Utilitarianism 503
1176. Common Sense: Actions and Reasons 504
1177. Moral Theories and Definite Answers 508
1178. Utilitarianism and Definite Answers 509
1179. Definite Answers and Practical Difficulties 510
1180. Common-Sense Objections to Quantitative Hedonism 514
83. Sidgwick: Axioms of Morality 517
1181. Limitations of the Dialectical Strategy 517
1182. The Axiomatic Strategy and Dialectical Argument 518
1183. Self-Evidence 519
1184. The Defects of Dogmatic Intuitionism 519
1185. The Axioms of Equity and Benevolence 521
1186. Do the Axioms Support Utilitarianism? 523
1187. A Revised Axiom of Prudence 525
1188. Prudence and Maximization 527
1189. The Derivation of Utilitarianism 528
1190. The Development of the Argument 530
1191. Has Sidgwick Justified Prudence? 531
1192. Rawls’s Objections 534
1193. Prudence and the Self 535
1194. A Puzzle about Prudence and the Self 536
1195. Persons, Wholes, and Distribution 539
1196. Prudence and Benevolence 541
1197. Utilitarianism and Equality 542
1198. An Objection Derived from Equality 543
1199. The ‘Synthesis’ of Utilitarianism and Intuitionism 545
1200. Egoism and the Ultimately Reasonable 547
1201. Why is There a Dualism of Practical Reason? 549
1202. Egoism and ‘Reasonable for Me’ 551
1203. Agent-Relative Reasons? 554
1204. Why Does the Dualism Matter? 556
1205. How Should the Dualism be Resolved? 557
1206. Questions about Sidgwick’s Dualism 558
1207. Prospects for Utilitarianism: Conservative Defences 560
1208. Prospects for Utilitarianism: Revisionary Defences 562
1209. Ideal Utilitarianism 563
84. Bradley 565
1210. The British Idealists 565
1211. The Impact of Idealism 566
1212. Differences Between Bradley and Green 568
1213. Free Will, Responsibility, and the Self 569
1214. Why Should I be Moral? 573
1215. Introduction of Self-Realization 576
1216. Self-Realization and the Moral Outlook 577
1217. Self-Realization in Rational Action 579
1218. Realizing the Self as a Whole 581
1219. Realizing Selves by Realizing Capacities 582
1220. Realizing Selves as Infinite Wholes 583
1221. Errors about Self-Realization 585
1222. Utilitarianism 587
1223. Criticism of Kant 590
1224. Emptiness 591
1225. Dualism 594
1226. My Station and its Duties: Reconciliation of Morality with Self-Realization? 596
1227. Different Roles of my Station and its Duties 598
1228. Self-Realization and True Morality 599
1229. The Good Self 600
1230. Being a Whole by Joining a Whole 601
1231. Morality and Ends 604
1232. Kantian Morality and Self-Realization 605
1233. The Scope of Morality 608
85. Green 610
1234. Green and Bradley on the History of Ethics 610
1235. The Self and the Will 612
1236. Self-Satisfaction and Self-Identification 614
1237. Degrees of Self-Identification 616
1238. Self-Realization and the Errors of Hedonism 619
1239. Does Utilitarianism Require Hedonism? 622
1240. Does Non-Hedonist Utilitarianism Answer Green? 623
1241. Green’s Defence of Kant 626
1242. Green’s Appeal to Greek Ethics 631
1243. Green’s View of the Aristotelian Virtues 634
1244. Aristotle on the Fine and the Virtues 636
1245. The Self and the Common Good 639
1246. The Development of Concern for the Common Good 641
1247. The Non-Competitive Common Good 642
1248. The Common Good, Utilitarianism, and Kant 644
1249. The Composition of the Common Good 647
1250. Kant and Idealism 651
86. Moore 654
1251. Moore and Sidgwick 654
1252. Compositional Definitions 655
1253. Real Definitions 657
1254. What is the Naturalistic Fallacy? 658
1255. Who Commits the Naturalistic Fallacy? 659
1256. The Open Question Argument 661
1257. Does the Open Question Argument Show that Good is Indefinable? 662
1258. When is a Question Open? 663
1259. Objections to Some Naturalist Definitions of Good 665
1260. Moore’s Second Thoughts 668
1261. Natural Properties and Intrinsic Properties 670
1262. Descriptive v. Non-Descriptive Properties 671
1263. Why is Ethics Not a Natural Science? 672
1264. Evaluative Properties and Non-Natural Properties 673
1265. The Open Question Argument and Real Definitions 674
1266. Does Non-Naturalism Require Intuitionism? 676
1267. Non-Naturalism and Holism 678
1268. Conceptual Utilitarianism and the Open Question Argument 679
1269. Conceptual Utilitarianism and Ethical Argument 681
1270. Value, Normativity, and Obligation: Frankena on Moore 682
1271. Why Utilitarianism? 684
1272. Intrinsic Value 686
1273. Intrinsic Goods and Egoism 688
87. Ross 691
1274. Ross and Intuitionism 691
1275. Doubts about the Open Question Argument 692
1276. Indefinability 694
1277. Objections to Naturalism 695
1278. Explications 696
1279. Objections to Non-Natural Properties 698
1280. Non-Natural Properties, Facts, and Values 699
1281. A Defence of Non-Natural Properties 701
1282. The Property of Rightness v. the Right-Making Property 703
1283. The Relevance of Properties to Moral Inquiry 704
1284. Ross v. Socrates on Explanatory Properties 706
1285. Ross v. Moore on Properties 707
1286. Arguments about the Right-Making Property 708
1287. How Does Ross Argue Against Utilitarianism? 710
1288. Utilitarianism and Self-Evidence 713
1289. Should Ross Reject Intuitionism? 715
1290. Intuitionism v. Holism 716
1291. An Argument for Holism 717
1292. Intuitionism as Pluralism 719
88. Logical Empiricism and Emotivism 721
1293. Moore and Non-Cognitivism 721
1294. The Logical Empiricist Ideal of Scientific Knowledge 722
1295. Strict v. Moderate Empiricism 723
1296. Empiricism and Ethics 724
1297. Facts and Values: Weber 725
1298. Facts and Standards: Popper 727
1299. Moore, Hume, and Non-Cognitivism 729
1300. Stevenson’s Analysis 730
1301. Intelligent Disagreement 732
1302. Stevenson’s Conditions for Adequate Definition 733
1303. Can Stevenson Accept the Open Question Argument? 735
1304. Can Stevenson Do Without Moore? 736
1305. The ‘Magnetism’ of Moral Judgments 737
1306. Moore’s Criticism of Stevenson 739
1307. Hare’s Criticism of Stevenson 740
1308. Implications of Moore’s and Hare’s Objections 741
1309. Emotivism and Meaning 742
1310. The Inadequacy of an Emotivist Analysis 744
1311. Emotivism and Analytic Truth 745
1312. Does Emotivism Discredit Morality? 747
1313. Does it Matter if Emotivism Discredits Morality? 749
1314. Emotivism, Scepticism, and Nihilism 750
89. Lewis 753
1315. Lewis as a Naturalist 753
1316. The Error in Non-Cognitivism 756
1317. Objectivity 757
1318. What are Evaluative Judgments About? 759
1319. Terminating Judgments and Objective Judgments 760
1320. Empiricism and Ethics 764
1321. Norms and Rationality 765
1322. Synthetic Intuitions about Value 768
1323. The Moral Point of View 770
90. Hare: A Defence of Non-Cognitivism 775
1324. Hare’s Aims 775
1325. Conditions of Adequacy 777
1326. Prescriptivism v. Emotivism 779
1327. Hare’s Reconstruction of Moore 781
1328. Commendatory Function 783
1329. Evaluative Use Without Prescriptive Meaning? 784
1330. Moral Judgments, Reasons, and Prescriptions 785
1331. Is Hare’s Position Consistent? 788
1332. Non-Naturalism and Intuitionism 789
1333. Argument from the Neutrality of Moral Language to Prescriptivism 792
1334. Disagreement, Argument, and Reform 794
1335. Further Options for Cognitivism 796
1336. Universalizability 798
1337. Are Moral Principles Overriding? 799
1338. Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism 802
1339. Utilitarianism Derived from Preferences 804
1340. Preferences and Probabilities 806
1341. Preferences v. Prescriptions 807
1342. The Gap Between Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism 810
91. Existentialism 813
1343. Ethical Relevance 813
1344. Motivation for Existentialism 815
1345. The Starting Point 816
1346. Human Beings and the World 820
1347. Being in the World 822
1348. Equipment and Environment 823
1349. Objections to Descartes 825
1350. A Voluntarist Objection to Descartes 827
1351. Questions about Heidegger’s Objections to Descartes 828
1352. Self and Others 830
1353. Care 832
1354. The ‘They’ 835
1355. Moods, Affects, and Being-In 837
1356. The They and its Idle Talk 839
1357. Falling and Authenticity 841
1358. Anxiety 842
1359. Authenticity and the Errors of Traditional Ontology 844
1360. Authenticity, Facts, and Values 845
92. Revivals of Non-Cognitivism 848
1361. Should the Open Question Argument be Revived? 848
1362. Moore and Normativity 849
1363. Supervenience and Objectivist Non-Naturalism 851
1364. Gibbard’s Argument for Non-Cognitivism 853
1365. Objections to Gibbard’s Account 855
1366. An Evolutionary Argument for Non-Cognitivism 856
1367. The Appeal of Quasi-Realism 858
1368. Quasi-Realism on Conditionals 860
1369. Quasi-Realism on Counterfactuals and Independence 862
1370. What Should We Expect from Quasi-Realism? 864
1371. Non-Cognitivism v. Nihilism 865
93. Objectivity and its Critics 867
1372. Further Attacks on Objectivism 867
1373. What Difference Does Objectivity Make? 869
1374. Are Moral Judgments Essentially Prescriptive? 871
1375. What is Wrong with Objective Prescriptivity? 874
1376. Supervenience 875
1377. What is Wrong with Queerness? 876
1378. Objective Prescriptivity and Categorical Requirements 878
1379. Relativity and Disagreement 878
1380. A Place for Morality Without Objectivity 881
1381. How Should We Replace Morality? 884
1382. Are Moral Concepts Natural? 886
1383. Are Moral Properties Natural? 887
1384. Varieties of Objectivism 890
1385. Objectivism and Justification 893
1386. Implications for Normative Ethics? 894
1387. Objectivism and Dogmatism 895
1388. Implications for Moral Theory? 897
94. Versions of Naturalism 898
1389. Attitudes to Naturalism 898
1390. Naturalism Without the Naturalistic Fallacy 899
1391. Morality and Motivation 900
1392. Naturalism, Facts, and Values 901
1393. Naturalism and Conceptions of Nature 902
1394. Naturalism as Metaphysical Biology 903
1395. Does Naturalism Need Metaphysical Biology? 904
1396. Naturalism and Teleology 906
1397. Objections to Naturalism Without Metaphysical Biology 907
1398. Naturalism and Real Interests 909
1399. The Connexion Between Nature and Well-Being 910
1400. Moral Objections to Naturalism 912
1401. Moral Arguments for Naturalism 915
1402. Moral and Non-Moral Aspects of Naturalism 917
95. Rawls: The Just, the Fair, and the Right 921
1403. Rawls and his Predecessors 921
1404. A Systematic Alternative to Utilitarianism 922
1405. The Social Contract Tradition 924
1406. A Defence of Kant 925
1407. Method and Justification 926
1408. Considered Judgments 928
1409. Moral Theory and Linguistic Theory 929
1410. Ought We to Pursue Reflective Equilibrium? 930
1411. Is the Pursuit of Reflective Equilibrium Consistent with Objectivism? 933
1412. The Rejection of Intuitionism 935
1413. What Should Rawls Prove about Justice? 936
1414. Why the Original Position? 937
1415. Justice, Fairness, and the Original Position 938
1416. Arguments for Fairness 939
1417. The Point of the Original Position 941
1418. The Strategy of Argument 943
1419. Moral Constraints on the Original Position 944
1420. Knowledge and Motivation in the Original Position 946
1421. Mutual Disinterest 948
1422. The Good v. Primary Goods 949
1423. Aversion to Risk 952
1424. Utilitarian Objections to the Original Position 955
1425. Doubts about Rawls’s Strategy 956
96. Rawls: The Right and the Good 960
1426. The Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness 960
1427. Freedom and Equality 962
1428. Why Accept a Kantian Doctrine of Equality? 964
1429. Are the Principles of Justice Categorical Imperatives? 966
1430. The Significance of the Kantian Interpretation 968
1431. Self-Respect v. Self-Esteem 970
1432. How Kant Might Support Rawls 972
1433. The Priority of the Right over the Good 973
1434. A Subjectivist Conception of the Good 974
1435. Doubts about Rawls’s Subjectivist Account of the Good 975
1436. The Diversity of Goods 977
1437. Primary Goods and the Priority of the Right 978
1438. Primary Goods, Freedom, and Equality 980
1439. Self-Realization and Treating Oneself as an End 982
1440. Self-Realization and Morality 984
1441. Idealism and Holism 985
1442. Constructivism in Moral and Political Philosophy 985
1443. Political v. Moral Constructivism 988
1444. ‘Kantian’ Constructivism v. Objectivism 989
Bibliography 991
Index 1034
A 1034
B 1034
C 1035
D 1036
E 1037
F 1037
G 1038
H 1038
I 1040
J 1040
K 1041
L 1041
M 1042
N 1043
O 1043
P 1044
Q 1045
R 1045
S 1046
T 1048
U 1048
V 1049
W 1049

Annotation This book is a selective historical and critical study of moral philosophy in the Socratic tradition, with special attention to Aristotelian naturalism. It discusses the main topics of moral philosophy as they have developed historically, including: the human good, human nature, justice, friendship, and morality; the methods of moral inquiry; the virtues and their connexions; will, freedom, and responsibility; reason and emotion; relativism, subjectivism, and realism; the theological aspect of morality. The first volume discusses ancient and mediaeval moral philosophy. The second volume examines early modern moral philosophy from the 16th to the 18th century. This third volume continues the story up to Rawls's Theory of Justice. A comparison between the Kantian and the Aristotelian outlook is one central theme of the third volume. The chapters on Kant compare Kant both with his rationalist and empiricist predecessors and with the Aristotelian naturalist tradition. Reactionsto Kant are traced through Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. Utilitarian and idealist approaches to Kantian and Aristotelian views are traced through Sidgwick, Bradley, and Green. Mill and Sidgwick provide a link between 18th-century rationalism and sentimentalism and the 20th-century debates in the metaphysics and epistemology of morality. These debates are explored in Moore, Ross, Stevenson, Hare, C.I. Lewis, Heidegger, and in some more recent meta-ethical discussion. This volume concludes with a discussion of Rawls, with special emphasis on a comparison of his position with utilitarianism, intuitionism, Kantianism, naturalism, and idealism. Since this book seeks to be not only descriptive and exegetical, but also philosophical, it discusses the comparative merits of different views, the difficulties that they raise, and how some of the difficulties might be resolved. It presents the leading moral philosophers of the past as participants in a rational discussionin which the contemporary reader can participate

2011-06-04